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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
Case No.
7371

-vsJACK L. CLARK,

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was convicted of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter, by a verdict of the jury, on April 12, 1949.
The complaint arose out of an automobile accident which
occurred on December 16, 1948, approximately 11:30 p.m.,
at or near 2800 South State Street, in Salt Lake County.
Prior to the accident the defendant had been operating a
1940 Buick automobile in a northerly direction on State
Street. With him were the deceased and two other young
people riding in the front seat and five other people riding
in the rear seat, making a total of nine people in the au. .
tomobile. The highway was icy and slippery, but defendant
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was operating his car at about the same speed as other
cars ahead of him when his car began to slide to the left
over across the center line and into the path of a south. .
bound Packard automobile being operated by Jack R.
Price. Before either of the two drivers were able to reduce
the speed at which they were traveling the automobiles
came together head on, injuring several of the passengers
in defendant's automobile and resulting in the death of
John Dale Cutler, a passenger in the front seat.
The accident was investigated by the Highway Patrol
and South Salt Lake police some time after it had occurred
and Jack L. Clark was arrested and charged with the crime
of involuntary manslaughter, of which crime he was later
convicted. It is from that verdict and the judgment entered
thereon that this appeal is taken. Because the principal
point raised by this appeal is the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence, a more detailed statement as to the testi. .
mony of the various witnesses will be given later.
At the conclusion of the State's case, defendant made
a motion for dismissal upon the ground that the evidence
was insufficient to "establish criminal negligence in the
operation of the vehicle by the defendant at the time and
place of the accident." (R. 124) This motion was denied
by the court; and the defendant thereupon submitted evi. .
dence which in many respects agreed with the testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution, but which evidence
also more fully explained the reason for defendant's auto. .
mobile sliding into the opposite lane of traffic.
The court, in its instructions to the jury, submitted to
them the question of whether the defendant was guilty of
either of two alleged unlawful acts: ( 1) that the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
drove an automobile at a rate of speed greater than was
reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing;
and ( 2) that he drove an automobile to the left side of the
center of the roadway while overtaking and passing another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction at a time when
the left..hand side of the highway was not free of oncoming
traffic for such a sufficient distance ahead as to permit
him to complete the pass and return to the right.-hand side
of the highway in time to avoid a collision with an auto.mobile proceeding in the opposite direction. (R. 14, 15)
Defendant, in addition to making a motion for dis.missal for insufficiency of the evidence, excepted to the
court's instructions submitting to the jury either of the
foregoing alleged unlawful acts upon the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to establish either as an act of
"reckless conduct, or conduct evincing a marked disregard
for the safety of others." (R. 155, 156) Defendant also ex.cepted to the refusal of the court to give defendant's re.quested instruction to the effect that "skidding or sliding of
an automobile on a slippery highway is not in and of itself
evidence of operating an automobile with reckless or
wanton disregard for the safety of others." (R. 156) And
it is the allaged errors of the trial court in these particu.lars that form the basis for this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellant relies upon the following points for a re.versal of the verdict and judgment of conviction in the
court below:
1. The evidence was insufficient to show that de.fendant was guilty of "reckless conduct, or conduct evinc.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing a marked disregard for the safety of others." Particu.larly, there was insufficient evidence from which the jury
<;:auld conclude either
(a) that the defendant drove his automobile at a
speed greater than was reasonable and prudent,
having regard for the actual and potential haz..
ards then existing; or
{b) that the defendant drove his automobile to the
left of the center of the highway in an attempt
to overtake and pass another vehicle proceed.ing in the same direction.
2. In giving its Instruction No. 7, the court improp.erly failed to instruct the jurors that they must all agree
upon one or both of the alleged acts of wilful or wanton
misconduct.
3. The court improperly failed to give defendant's
requested Instruction No. 2, to the effect that the mere
fact "that an automobile skids or slides while proceeding
along a wet or slippery street is no evidence that the party
operating said automobile is operating the same at an ex.cessive ·rate of speed or in a careless or negligent manner."
ARGUMENT
1. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUS.T AIN THE VERDICT.
Six witnesses were called on behalf of the State, to.wit: Jack R. Price {the driver of the other vehicle involved
in the accident), Van E. Porter (a photographer who took
some pictures at the scene of the accident some time after
it occurred), Donald W. Rice (a passenger in defendant's
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automobile), and three Highway Patrolmen who partici.pated in investigating the accident (Russell Cederlund,
Charles G. Fogle, and Raymond De Vine). In order that
a complete picture be obtained of the State's case, the testi.mony of these witnesses will be summarized.

Jack R. Price testified that he was driving a 1947
Packard sedan automobile belonging to Dr. Ellertson of
Murray, Utah, in a southerly direction on State Street in
the lane next to the center of the highway; that he had tra.veled in the same lane most of the way down State Street,
except when passing other cars. (R. 46, 47) It was cold
and the streets were continually icy-very icy. He had ob.served that condition earlier in the evening as he drove
up State from Murray. (R. 47, 48) There were no cars
immediately ahead of him as he traveled south,.and as he
neard the point where the accident ccurred he was travel.ing about 35 miles an hour. (R. 48) On cross.-examination
Mr. Price admited he had told the officers immediately
after the accident that he was traveling between 30 and
40 miles an hour; that he could have been going a little
faster than 35 or a little slower. (R. 55) During the mo.ments before the accident and up to the time it occurred,
he did not change the course of his automobile from one
lane of traffic to another. (R. 49) He observed four or five
automobiles approaching from the south in a normal fash.ion, when one of the automoibles came over to the west
side of the highway "into my line of traffic, and I would
estimate it would be two or three hundred feet down the
highway." (R. 49) At that time, upon suggestion of the
prosecuting atorney (and over objection· of defense coun . .
sel) the witness further stated that he thought the other
car was attempting to pass the other cars ahead. (R. 49,
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50) However, on cross.-examination the witness admitted
that he could not tell from the movement of the other car
what the driver was attempting to do; that he didn't know
how the other car got into the lane in which the witness
was traveling. Thereupon the court determined that it had
been wrong in overruling defendant's objection to the tes.timony in this respect and admonished the jury to disre. .
gard what the witness said as to "what this witness thought
the defendant was trying to do." (R. 57, 58)
At the time the northbound automobile came into the
lane occupied by the southbound car, the witness testi..
fied that he couldn't tell from that distance whether the
other automobile was skidding or not. (R. 57) At that
time the cars were between two hundred and three hun.dred feet apart. From then, until the cars were about 50
feet apart, the witness did nothing to turn into another
lane of traffic to avoid an accident, but continued in a
straight course down the highway. (R. 59) Immediately
prior to the time the car came over into the wrong lane,
there was the normal procession of cars going northward
and there were no other cars in the immediate vicinity
going south. (R. 59, 60) When the other car came within
50 feet of the witness he observed that it was then in the
process of skidding. (R. 57) He further admitted that he
had more than one and one..half seconds (after allowance
for reaction time) in which to change the course of his
automobile had he desired to do so after he first saw the
other car come into his lane of travel, but that he did
nothing to avert the accident. (R. 62)

Donald Rice, who was a passenger in defendant's au..
tomobile, testified that he had been with the deceased on
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the day of the accident, and that the two of them had met
the defendant up town. After they met they went out to
the Municipal swimming pool and from there to the Stork
Club on South State Street, approximately 34th South.
(R. 70, 71) A.ltogether there were five boys in the crowd.
At the Stork Club they met four girls and the group danced
and sat around for approximately an hour and a half,
during which time two pitchers of beer were consumedtwo glasses for each person. (R. 70. . 72) About 11: 15 p.m.
the group (nine in all) left the Club and got into the de. .
fendant's automobile and started up State Street. The de. .
fendant, Helen Johansen, John · Dale Cutler (the de. .
ceased), and Ruby Aldrich sat in front while the witness
and four others occupied the rear seat. (R. 72, 73) They
were going to the home of the witness, who lived just
east of State Street on Whitlock Ave. (2500 South). (R.
73)
As defendant drove north along State Street, there
was nothing unusual about his driving, nor did the car
skid at any time until just before the accident. As the car
started up from 33rd South (where they had stopped for
a traffic light) the wheels spun briefly before getting trac . .
tion, but otherwise everything was alright. "We was going
down State Street normal and everybody talking, and felt
the back end start sliding around" and right after that the
accident occurred. (R. 74, 75) The witness estimated the
speed of defendant's car to be approximately 30 to 35
miles per hour although he did not look at the speed. .
ometer. (R. 76) After the accident and before the police
arrived defendant's automobile was moved from the posi. .
tion it was in when it first came to rest. (R. 77) The wit. .
ness further stated that the hood of defendant's automo . .
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bile was lying right beside the car after the accident, but
that it was picked up and moved off the street before the
police came to investigate. (R. 78)
On cross.-examination Donald Rice re.-affirmed that
the automobile was traveling northward between thirty
and thirty.-five miles per hour; that nothing unusual oc.curred until he felt the back end go around-toward the
left-causing the automobile to go over onto the opposite
side of the road; that prior to the skidding the car had
been traveling in the lane next to the center of the road;
(R. 79) that he knew of nothing that could have caused
the automobile to skid unless the car struck an icy spot.
The road was bare in places and icy in other places. (R.
81, 82)

Van E. Porter, a press photographer, testified that at
approximately 12: 15 a.m. on the morning of December 17,
1948, he took some photographs of two autombiles at or
near 2800 South State Street. (R. 63) Exhibits A and B
were taken showing the damaged condition of a Packard
automobile; (R. 63) while Exhibits C and D showed the
damaged condition of a Buick automobile. (R. 64) He
also took a photograph of what appeared to be a motor
from the Buick automobile as shown by Exhibit E. (R.
65) On cross.-examination he admitted that his purpose
in taking the pictures (Exhibits A to E, inclusive) was so
that they might be published in connection with a news
item on the accident and that his attention was directed
particularly to the damaged portions of the cars, his object
being to accentuate the damaged areas. (R. 66, 67) He
also testified that he had no way of knowing how the two
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vehicles or the motor happened to be in the position they
were at the time he took the pictures.
Russell Cederlund, a State Highway Patrolman, per. .
sonally investigated the accident, arriving at the scene
shortly after midnight, (R. 91) and made certain measure. .
ments as to the location of the vehicles and objects on the
road. From his observations he prepared a diagram which
was introduced in evidence as Exhibit F. (R. 93) Near
the bottom of the diagram, the officer marked an "X" to
indicate the "possible point of impact" of the two auto. .
mobiles. (R. 94) The evidentiary factors considered by
him in arriving at this point were the debris, skid marks,
gouge marks, and scratches on the highway. (R. 94) How. .
ever, the officer did not explain that while these eviden. .
tiary factors were scattered over a considerable area he
was able to pinpoint the point of impact of the automo. .
biles. Obviously the cars came together in such a manner
that the entire front portions of both cars collided, along
with parts of the sides of each. And whether the officer
took the center of the area involved as being the point of
impact, or whether his measurements were made from one
side or the other of such area is not disclosed by the rec . .
ord. His measurements indicated that the point "X" was
16 feet west of the center of the highway and 12 feet east
of the west edge of the hard surface. Twenty. .five feet
northwesterly from the point "X" was located the Pack. .
ard automobile, facing in an easterly direction, while 77
feet northerly from the same point, the Buick automobile
was found, upright, and facing in a northeasterly direction.
The motor was located by the officer off the highway,
south and east of the Buick, approximately 75 feet, while
the hood was north and west off the highway, a distance
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of 177 feet from the Buick automobile. (R. 94, 95) He
further testified that the highway was icy in the portion
which had been used by the traffic, but that on each side
of the icy traveled way was an area of hard packed snow.
( R. 98)
The officer then identified Exhibit F as being a state..
ment taken by him and officers DeVine and Fogle from
the defendant at the County Hospital approximately one
and one..half hours after the accident (R. 100) In this
statement the defendant purportedly admitted he had had
6 or 7 beers at the Stork Club, although the officer ad..
mited that at the preliminary hearing he had testified from
his independent recollection that the defendant had said
3 or 4 beers when giving the statement. (R. 104, 105) He
also testified that both at the scene of the accident and
later at the hospital the defendant appeared in all respects
to be normal and in complete control of his faculties, ex..
cept for being upset and nervous. There was nothing ir..
regular about any of his activities or his talking or any..
thing else. (R. 113, 114)
Exhibit F also contains a purported remark by the
defendant to the effect that he was about to pass another
car when it pulled into the lane in which defendant was
driving thereby causing defendant to apply his brakes,
which resulted in his car skidding. In explanation of this
statement the officer testified that the defendant told him
that as the defendant was proceeding in the lane next to
the center o£ the highway, a car to his right (in the center
lane for northbound traffic) pulled over in front of the
defendant's automobile so that he was required to slow
up and that in attempting to do so his car started to skid
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and went out of control. (R. 106) State Street at the
place where the accic~ent occurred is normally a six lane
highway-three lanes for traffic in each direction. Appar. .
ently on the evening of the accident, there w~re at least
two lanes being used by traffic in each direction, although
the officer was unable to state whether one or two lanes
were being used by traffic that evening. (R. 108, 109)
The officer admitted on cross...examination that he did
not know how or when the vehicles and the motor and
hood arrived at the point where he measured them to be
in his investigation. (R. 106, 107) Although the Buick
motor was apparently severed from its mountings, those
mountings were made of rubber. (R. 114)
Officer Charles Glen Fogle testified that he was with
Officer De Vine and that they were the first officers to
arrive at the scene of the accident. (R. 117) While he
made no measurements (R. 119) he observed the general
location of the cars and objects and believed that they were
in the position shown by Officer Cederlund. (R. 117) He
was further present when Officer Cederlund took the
statement from the defendant and he witnessed it. (R.
118, 119)
Officer Raymond DeVine assisted Cederlund in tak. .
ing the measurements (R. 121) and later was present when
defendant's statement was taken, which statement he wit..nessed. (R. 122)

The foregoing evidence is substantially everything tes . .
tified to by the witnesses for the State in support of charge
of involuntary manslaughter. In fact, the evidence adduced
on behalf of the defendant (after the Court had denied
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defendant's motion to dismiss) substantially corroborated
the testimony of Donald Rice, one of the State's witnesses.
But it did go further and disclose where the Buick motor
was immediately after the accident and also further ex..
plained the reason for defendant's automobile going into
a skid and sliding over onto the wrong side of the high..
way. Since there is no dispute as to such evidence it is
also summarized, as follows:

Victor W. Jones, a witness for the defendant, testi..
:fied that he arrived at the scene of the accident shortly
after it occurred and prior to any police officer; that he
helped to right the Buick automobile which was lying on
its side; and that thereafter he observed the motor lying
just east of the center line of the highway. In lifting up
the Buick car it was moved to the west so that the car
was then just west of the center and the motor was lying
just east of the centerline of the highway. (R. 127, 128)

Jack L. Clark, the defendant, in addition to corrobor. .
ating the witness Rice as to the people who were riding in
the car; (R. 137) their destination; (R. 137) the speed at
which they were traveling; (R. 144) the condition of the
road-to the effect that it was bare in spots and icy in
spots; (R. 138) and the automobile was proceeding nor..
mally in the lane next to the center prior to the time it
began to skid (R. 139), also explained the cause of the
car skidding onto the wrong side of the road substantially
as contained in the written statement taken by Officer
Cederlund, but in more detail. He testified that as he
stopped for the traffic light at 33rd South he was in the
middle of the three lanes for northbound traffic; (R. 138)
that as he started up, he waited until the cars to his left
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\vent on ahead and then he moved over into the lane next
to the center and proceeded in the line of traffic north. .
ward; (R. 139). As they were traveling along-the car
ahead being about 50 feet in front of the Buick car, de-fendant testified that a car in the lane to his right (the
middle lane for northbound traffic) proceeded to pull
over into the lane in which defendant was traveling and
immediately ahead of his car, thereby requiring him to
attempt to slow up, in order to keep from striking the
other car or at least coming too close to it. Immediately
upon his applying the brakes he felt the back end go out
and the car skidded to the left into the lane immediately
west of the center line of the highway. (R. 140) He saw
the other car coming and cramped his wheels to see if he
could get out of its way, but was unable to do so and the
cars collided. (R. 141).
It therefore appears that there is nothing inconsistent
between the testimony of the defendant and that of the
State's witnesses, although defendant's evidence is some. .
what more explanatory. There is some conflict in the evi. .
dence as to whether the street was icy all over or whether
there were some bare spots. Rice and the defendant testi. .
fied that there were bare spots in the road, while Jack
R. Price testified that the road was icy all over the
traveled portion. Be that as it may, it is defendant's posi. .
tion that the foregoing evidence is insufficient to establish
wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct in the manner in which
he operated his automobile.

(A) The evidence is insufficient to prove that de ..
/endant drove at an excessive rate of speed.
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The direct and uncontroverted testimony of the state's
witnesses is to the effect that defendant was operating his
automobile at a speed of from 30.-40 miles per hour. Al. .
though there is some conflict in the evidence as to how slip.pery the streets were (some witnesses testifying that the
road was bare in spots while others testifying that it was
icy all over), there is no dispute that the general road
conditions were the same on the east side of the center of
the highway as they were on the west side of the center.
The evidence is further uncontroverted that the witness,
Jack R. Price, was traveling southward immediately to the
west of the center of the highway, at a speed of approxi.mately 35 miles per hour-it may have been a little more
or a litle less. It is also undisputed that prior to defen..
dant's car going into a skid onto the wrong side of the
road, it was traveling in a normal fashion in the line of
cars proceeding northward along State Street. While the
evidence does not disclose the posted speed limit along
State Street, the court can take judicial notice of the fact
that the prima..facie speed limit for nighttime driving on
the highways of the state is 50 miles per hour. Since de.fendant was traveling no faster than the other cars along
the highway on the evening in question, and in view of
the further fact that such speed was less than the prima.facie speed limit, there was no evidence to submit to the
jury on the question of excessive speed.
When defendant argued this point to the court on the
motion for a new trial, it was contended on the part of the
state that, notwithstanding the direct, positive and uncon.troverted testimony of the witnesses to the effect that de.fendant was driving in a normal and reasonable fashion
with the other cars, nevertheless, the physical evidence was
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such as to indicate that defendant was driving at an ex . .
cessive rate of speed. The so..called physical evidence relied
on consisted of the officer's observation that the Packard
automobile was found in a position 25 feet north of the
"possible point of impact," while the Buick automobile
continued to travel northerly for a distance of approxi . .
mately 77 feet from such point of impact. Assuming the
measurements to have accurately placed the automobiles
after the point of impact-and before either had been
moved-the mere fact that the automobiles upon colliding
caused one of them to bounce back a short distance, par.ticularly where the collision occurred on icy streets, is cer.tainly no evidence upon which to sustain a conviction of
reckless and wanton misconduct in operating an automo.bile at an excessive speed.

In the first splace, such evidence itself along with
other evidence of a similar character is circumstantial
and inconclusive and where a conviction of a crime rests
upon circumstantial evidence, it has long been determined
that such circumstantial evidence must be established with
certainty and must exclude every other reasonable hypo.t~esis, except the guilt of a defendant. In the case of People
v. Bearden, 290 N. Y. 478, 49 N. E. (2d) 785, the de.fendant was convicted of driving an automobile in a "reck.less and culpably negligent manner," whereby two persons
were killed. The evidence in support of the conviction was
circumstantial and the prosecution argued that the infer.ences "fairly to be drawn" from the evidence were suffi..
dent to be submitted to the jury. In setting forth the prin.ciple of law applicable to circumstantial evidence, the court
held:
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"Where, as in the present case, the defendant's
conviction rests solely upon circumstantial evi.dence, we examine the record in the light of the
rule that the facts from which the inference of de.fendant's guilt is drawn must be established with
certainty-they must be inconsistent with his in.nocence and must exclude to a moral certainty
every other reasonable hypothesis."
In the instant case the trial court failed in any way
to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to circum.stantial evidence, so that should it now be argued that
there was circumstantial evidence sufficient to justify the
court in submitting the matter to the jury, the court did
not do so upon that theory at all, but upon the theory that
the direct evidence of the witnesses was sufficient from
which the jury could conclude that defendant drove at an
excessive rate of speed.
Other physical factors .involved were the location of
the Buick motor and the hood at the time the police in.vestigated the accident, the extreme damage done to both
of the automobiles in question, and the fact that parts
of the automobiles appeared to be scattered over a wide
area. This evidence is explained by the State's own wit..
nesses, who testified that the hood had been moved off
the highway before the police arrived, and that the investi..
gation did not take place until some time after the acci.dent, during which time the Buick automobile had been
righted and moved and an opportunity given for parts to
be scattered about the highway by passing motorists or
onlookers. Neither was there an attempt on the part of the
State to interpret the physical evidence by expert testi.mony, nor to reduce the factors to a matter of opinion.
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As a matter of fact, the evidence was such that it could
not be reduced in any way to a conclusion as to any speed
on the part of either the southbound automobile or the
automobile being operated by the defendant. The fact that
the impact might have caused the southbound car to re..
bound 25 feet would not establish greater speed on the
part of the defendant's automobile because at the time
defendant's automobile, including the passengers therein,
weighed considerably more than the southbound vehicle.
The difference in weight itself would be sufficient to ex..
plain the position of the automobiles as found by the
police officers.
The courts have long recognized that to base a judg..
ment upon physical evidence is highly dangerous and
speculative, and where, as in the present case, such physi..
cal evidence is used to argue excessive speed in direct con.flict to the testimony of eye witnesses, the courts have re.fused to permit a judgment to stand based upon such
physical evidence.
In the case of State v. Bast, 116 Mont. 329, 151 Pac.
(2d) 1009, the defendant was charged with the crime of
manslaughter arising out of an automobile upset. The phy.sical evidence indicated that the automobile had left the
highway and proceeded along a shallow depression for a
distance of 268 feet through some low brush, and into a
hole, approximately 2 feet in depth, containing large rocks
which caused the automobile to be deflected and to side. .
swipe a tree. The contact with the tree damaged and flat.tened the right side of the car and embedded the bark on
the inside of the right rear door. The highway patrolman
who investigated the case testified that from his observa. .
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tion of the physical facts, it was his opinion that the car
must have been traveling from 55.-60 miles per hour at
the time it left the highway. In reversing a judgment of
conviction, the Supreme Court stated:
"The state's only testimony to refute that of the
three surviving occupants of the Herman car, to
the effect that defendant was driving at the moder.ate rate of speed of between 30 and 35 miles an
hour, was that of the boy Roedel and of the high.way patrolman Blake, who, over objection, testi.fied that from his observation of the road and the
car after his arrival on the scene, he was led to
believe that a car would have to be traveling close
to fifty miles an hour to cover this ground and
cause the damage it did to this car.
"As before stated, Patrolman Blake did not witness
the happening of the accident for at the time it
occurred he was at his home in Kalispell some 10
or more miles distant and he certainly did not
qualify to testify with any degree of accuracy as to
the miles per hour the car was traveling some forty
or fifty minutes before he came into the picture.
Such guesswork, speculation and conjecture can.not be said to rise to the dignity of evidence on
which to sustain a conviction of the serious crime
here charged. The burden rested upon the state
throughout the case and this burden it failed to
meet for we are committed to the doctrine that 'a
defendant may not be convicted on conjectures,
however shrewd, on suspicions, however strong,
but only upon evidence which establishes guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; that is, upon proof such
as to logically compel the conviction that the
charge is true.' State v. Riggs, 61 Mont. 25, 201
P. 272, 280."
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In Huber v. Rosing, 22 Wash. (2d) 110, 154 P. (2d)
609, the action was commenced to recover for injuries re...
suiting from an automobile accident, the plaintiff alleging
that the defendant was negligent in the operation of her au . .
tomobile. The court made a finding of negligence in that ap. .
pellant's car was operated at a speed in excess of 15 miles
an hour (the maximum speed fixed for the zone in which
the cars were traveling). While the record contained no
direct evidence that the car was traveling in excess of 15
miles per hour, the trial court found that excessive speed
was indicated by the "nature of the damages suffered by
the cars involved in the accident." As stated by the Su. .
preme Court in its opinion:
"No witness, expert or non. .expert, attempted toes. .
timate the speed of appellant's car, basing his tes. .
timony upon the damage suffered by the cars as
the result of the collision. The trial court, from
the evidence referred to only, reached the conclu. .
sion which resulted in the finding of excessive
speed."
The court indicated that it had in previous cases con. .
sidered the damages to the vehicles in connection with the
determination of the question of speed.
"In the case of Oyster v. Dye, 7 Wash. 2d 674,
110 P. (2d) 863, 866, 133 A. L. R. 720, which
was a case involving a collision between a passen. .
ger automobile and a truck, this court considered
the testimony of one who was extremely familiar
with automobiles, who had been called as a wit. .
ness by respondens and had been permitted totes . .
tify, over the objection of appellants, as to his
opinion concerning the speed of appellant's car
prior to the impact, his testimony having been
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based upon his examination of photographs of the
two cars taken after tpe collision. This court held
that the witness was not qualified to testify as an
expert, and that the admsision of his testimony
was reversible error, the testimony amounting 'to
no more than an estimate or guess by a witness
not qualified to testify as an expert.' In the course
of the opinion we said: 'This court has held that
in certain cases the force or violence of a collision
between a motor vehicle and a person, another ve..
hicle, or any other object, may be considered in
estimating speed. [Citing cases] This, of course,
is proper in many instances, as the result of a col..
lision may indicate the speed of a colliding car,
and evidence concerning the situation after a col.lision may always be considered by the trier of the
facts, the facts being given such weight as is proper
·under the circumstances.'
"In the case at bar there was no direct evidence as
to the speed of appellant's car, except the testi.mony of appellant's witnesses above referred to.
The trial court disregarded this testimony and
based its finding as to appellant's negligence solely
upon the extent and nature of the damage suffered
by the cars as the result of the collision. In other
words, the extent of the damage was taken as in ..
dicative of the force of the impact, and the force
of the impact was considered a sufficient basis for
a finding that appellant's car had been moving at
excessive speed." (Italics added.)
So, in the instant case, the trial court apparently al.lowed the jury to disregard the positive and direct testi.mony of both the State's witnesses and defendant, to specu.late as to the speed of the vehicles based upon the physical
damage and their relative positions at the time the officers
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arrived to investigate. No one will dispute the fact that the
cars came together with a terrific impact. Their combined
speeds, according to the testimony of the witnesses, would
be approximately 65 to 75 miles per hour. But such com.bined speed would not indicate excessive speed on the part
of either of the vehicles prior to that time.
In the Huber Case, supra, the court went on to state:
"In the case of Proper v. Brenner, 191 Wash. 540,
71 P. 2d 389, 392, we said: 'It is often dangerous
to arrive at conclusions from mere physical fact:;.
It is, for example, rarely, if ever, safe to attempt
to judge the rate of speed from a consideration of
the amount of physical damage done; but. there
are situations where physical facts are controlling.'
"In 10 Blash:field, Cyc. of Automobile Law & Prac.tice, Perm. Ed., p. 349, Sec. 6560, the Proper case
was cited with approval, the author, concerning
that case, saying: 'To arrive at conclusions from
physical facts alone, however, is often dangerous.
It has been said to be rarely, if ever, safe to at.tempt to judge the rate of speed merely from a
consideration of the amount of physical damage
done.'
"The above text states a sound rule and is certainly
applicable to the facts in the case at bar."
And finally concluded:
"The court's finding above quoted clearly indicates
that the finding of excessive speed was based solely
upon the nature and extent of the damages to the
two cars which collided. Examination of the state.ment of facts discloses no evidence concerning the
speed of appellant's car other than that above re.ferred to. While the condition of automobiles af..
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ter a collision may properly be considered in esti..
mating the speed of one or more of the cars in.volved in an accident, we are convinced that the
evidence concerning the condition of the two cars
in question does not support the court's finding
that appellant's car was moving at a speed greater
than 15 miles per hour.
.
"The finding is contrary to all the direct evidence
as to the speed of appellant's car. Evidence such
as that upon which the trial court based its find ..
ing is, at best, in its nature speculative and un..
certain, and unless unusually convincing (which
the evidence in the case at bar is not) should not
be held to outweigh uncontradicted testimony of
witnesses who spoke from actual knowledge. The
witnesses who testified to the speed of appellant's
car were nowise discredited, and two of them, Mr.
and Mrs. Chabot, appear to have been entirely
disinterested."
thereby determining that the evidence was insufficient to
establish negligence, while in the instant case we are con.cerned with the question of reckless and wanton conduct.
In Reel v. Spencer, 187 Va. 530, 47 S. E. (2d) 359,
a guest brought an action against the driver of the automo.bile on the theory that the latter was guilty of "gross negli.gence." At the time of the accident it was raining and the
streets were slippery. The undisputed testimony was that
the automobile was being operated at a speed of 15 to 20
miles an hour. The impact pushed the other vehicle side.ways about 5 feet and caused considerable damage. In de.termining that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient
to show excessive speed in view of the direct and positive
testimony, the court stated:
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"lv1o:·eover, it is said that the Reel car must have
been traveling at an excessive speed because ac...
cording to Johnson's testimony the Reel car tra. .
versed a distance of some 126 feet while the John . .
son car was making its turn, and the force of the
impact was so severe as to push the Johnson car
sideways about five feet, inflicting considerable
damage to it ....
"Miss Spencer, the plaintiff below, testified that as
the Reel car approached the intersection it was
'not going fast,' but was being driven 'in a normal
manner.' Indeed, all of the direct testimony on the
subject was to the effect that the Reel car was pro...
ceeding at the moderate speed of from fifteen to
twenty miles per hour. Not even Johnson testified
to the contrary. The fact that the Johnson car
was pushed a short distance along the slippery
street and considerably damaged by the impact did
not necessarily show excessive speed. The same
result might have followed had the Reel car been
proceeding at a moderate speed."
Again in the case of Commonwealth v. Ushka, 130
Pa. Sup. 600, 198 Ad. 465, where the defendant was pro. .
secuted for the crime of involuntary manslaughter, the
court held:
"The only evidence from which it might be inferred
that he was otherwise proceeding in a rash or reck...
less manner at the time of the accident was the
relative position and condition of the motor ve. .
hides after the collision. The position of cars after
an accident may warrant some inferences. See
Com. v. Fowner, 97 Pa. Super. 566; Com. v. Mat-teo, supra [ 197 Ad. 787]. But the physical facts
in those cases were much different from the phy-sical facts in the instant case. After appellant's
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Ford car was struck on the leftftont door by the
llf2--ton truck, it went over to the right, hit a tele-phone pole at the curb, and continued south on
Limekiln pike about 78 feet. Fron.l the place of the
collision it traversed about 130 feet. It :did not up-set, but stopped in frorit of ,the tailor shop on
Limekiln pike. The truck swung to the left, turned
completely around, and fell over on its fight side,
:which was 'damaged, at the southwest corner of
the intersection.' There were ·skid marks showing
the arc ,made ,by the truck. From th~ point of col-lision to the overturned truck the. distance in a
straight line was 52 feet.

"Such icircum_stances alone do not w~rrant the in--

fer~n~e .that appellant··was driving . his ~ar at an
excessive rate. of speed or in, a rash ~r reckless
manner.";
·

Again in the :syllabu~ to K?ies.v. ·J~raftsow, 40 Atl.
(2d) 122, the following statement, is contained:
"Where .automobile collision at intersection could
have .occurred in ·the manner related by plaintiff;
. defendant could not .invoke .to establish contribu-tory negligence of plai'lltiff the rule ~f incontr9ver.tible physical facts as to speed of defendant's auto-mobile or distance from intersection when plaintiff
entered intersection based on plaintiff's estimates
of speed and distance and the .distance traveled by
plaintiff's automobile before ·collision, since such
physical facts cannot be established by oral testi-mony of relative. speeds and positions of moving
objeCts.''
In Whitingv. Andrus, 173 Or. 133, 144 P. (2d) 501,
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st~ces

speed may be inferred from. the circumstances of
the case, held:
"The collision caused the defendant's car to bounce
backward 'eight or ~en or. twelve feet', and the de.fendant . contends that the Jury mig~t have de..
duq!d from that fact that the Merrill. car was
being d,riven at an excessive rate ofspee<;J. Where
excessive speed may reasonably be inferred from
the facts and circq.mstances, direct evidence there.. ()f Is not required..·. Gieens}jtt y. Three 8ros. Bak.ing C9., Or., J33 P. (2d) 597. ML M~rrill's car
wa.s ·,~. Swdebaker. sedan,.· while ·the defendant's
was a Ford coupe,:· and. we' do not. believe that the
mere fact that the, lighter car _pounced backward
would justify . a jury ·in finding that ·the heavier
car was being driven at an excessive rate .of speed.
Norie of ·the persoJ)s. who. saw the. Merrill car ap.. proaching the scene of the~ accident. testified to any
· facts whi~h ·would indicate excessive speed, or that
there was anything· about Merrill's ··driving which
. would indicate recklessness or negligence~"
In Celner v. Prather, 301 Ill. App. 224, 22 N. E.
(2d) 397 ~ :t4e, actio~ was by a guest _agq.inst. the ~riyer of
an automobile for injuries puffere~l when the car $tru,ck
a concrete. culvert,. the the9ry being that Jhe driver: was
guilty~{ wilful and wanton. m;,sco{\dU~t. The court, in.re.versing a judgment for the plaintiff and 'rem~ding the
case for a new trial, stated~
l

""t4e only thing.· the evidence di~d~ses . is 't~at .it
' struck ;the concrete 'abutrnent with great ·force and
violence.· Whether this was the result of the de.ceased's wilful ·and wanton misconduct,. or whe.ther it might have resulted. from mechanical causes
connected ,with the· .car, or was the result of de.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceased's negligence, cannot be determined from
the evidence. Appellee urges that the force of the
impact of the automobile with the concrete cul-vert, and on the opposite side of the highway from
which the car was traveling, is sufficient evidence
to establish wilful and wanton misconduct on the
part of the deceased. Proof of a mere possibility
is not sufficient. A theory can not be said to be
established by circumstantial evidence, unless the
facts are of such a nature and so related, as to
make it the only conclusion that could reasonably
be drawn. It can not be said one fact can be in-ferred, when the existence of another inconsistent
fact can be drawn with equal certainty. From the
evidence in this case there is no way to determine
if the accident was the result of wilful and wanton
misconduct on the part of the deceased, or from
some unexpected mechanical cause over which he
had no control, or such an accident as might have
been the result of ordinary negligence.

w.

See, also, Piscopo v. Fruciano, 307 Mich. 433, 12 N.
(2d) 329.

(B) The evidence is insufficient to prove that de-fendant drove his automobile to the left of the center o/
the highway in an attempt to overtake and pass another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction.
Upon what theory the court submitted to the jury the
question of whether defndant was in the act of overtaking
and passing another vehicle at the time of the accident
cannot be determined from an examinaiton of the record.
The only evidence on this point was that of the witness
Price, who testified that he "thought" that defendant was
attempting to pass the vehicles ahead of him when he
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saw def~ndant's automobile come over on to the wrong
side of the highway. Thereafter, the court admonished the
jury to disregard any eYidence relating to what the wit-r..ess thought defendant was doing. The witness, Donald
Rice, who was a passenger in defendant's car, testified on
direct examination by the district attorney that defendant's
automobile was proceeding in a normal manner north
along State Street when the rear end began skidding to
the left and caused the automobile to slide across the cen-ter of the highway. Again we maintain that the evidence
was insufficient to submit this matter to the jury.
Whether the court may have assumed that merely be-cause the automobile did appear on the wrong side of the
road, such fact was sufficient from which the jury could
infer that it was attempting to pass other vehicles proceed-ing in the same direction is not known to the writer of this
brief. However, such an inference in the face of direct,
positive and uncontradicted testimony as to the cause of
defendant's automobile being on the wront side of the road
would not justify the court in submitting the question to
the jury. Again we emphasize that if it is to be argued that
the verdict of the jury can be sustained upon the basis of
circumstantial evidence the court should have instructed
the jury as to the weight to be given to such circumstantial
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. As
stated in the case of Luther v. Jones, 220 Iowa 95, 261

N. W. 817:
"To warrant the jury in returning a verdict for the
plaintiff, based upon circumstantial evidence alone,
the circumstances relied upon by the plaintiff must
be of such a nature and so related to each other
that the only conclusion that can be fairly or reas.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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onably drawn therefrom is the conclusion indi. .
cated by the verdict. It is not sufficient that the
circumstances be consistent merely with the plain. .
tiff's theory, for that may be true and yet they may
have no tendency to prove the theory. If other con. .
elusions than that contended for may reasonably
be drawn from the facts and circumstances in evi. .
dence as to the cause of the injury, the evidence
does not support the conclusion sought to be
drawn from it. Neal v. Railway Co., 129 Iowa,
page 5, 105 N. W. 197, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 905.
See, also, Kearney v. Town of DeWitt, 199 Iowa
530, 202 N. W. 253; Peterson v. Dolan, 186 Iowa
848, 855, 172 N. W. 950; Wiederin v. Chicago &
N. W. R. Co., 212 Iowa 1103, 237 N. W. 344."
From the foregoing it appears that the trial court
erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether
defendant was operating his automobile at an excessive
rate of speed in view of the actual and potential hazards
then existing, since there is no evidence that defendant
operated his automobile at a speed in excess of 30--40 miles
per hour and there is nothing in the record to indicate
that such a speed was, in view of all the circumstances and
conditions, excessive. Neither should the court have al . .
lowed the jury to consider whether the defendant was
operating his automobile on the wrong side of the road
in an attempt to overtake and pass other vehicles proceed.ing ahead of him. But the court at all events should have
granted defendant's motion for a dismissal on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to submit to the jury.
2. THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE
JURORS THAT THEY MUST ALL AGREE UPON
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ONE OR BOTH OF THE ALLEGED ACTS OF WIL·
FUL OR WANTON MISCONDUCT.
Inasmuch as it was defendant's theory of the case that
there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury, particu.larly on the matter of whether defendant was attempting
to pass other vehicles, no request was made for an instruc.tion to the effect that before the jurors could find the de.fendant guilty, they must unanimously determine that he
was guilty of wilful or wanton misconduct as to one or
both of the alleged grounds set forth in the court's instruc.tions. The court did not in its Instruction No. 7, or in any
other instruction, advise the jurors that they were required
to agree upon one or both of such alleged acts of miscon.duct, so that it left it to the jury to speculate whether de.fendant may have been guilty of driving at an excessive
speed, or operating his automobile upon the wrong side
of the road in an attempt to pass other vehicles. In one of
the earliest manslaughter cases arising out of an automo.bile accident in this State, this court made a determina.tion that the trial court should instruct the jury so as to
advise them clearly that they must all concur upon the
same alleged act of wilful misconduct in order to return
a verdict of guilty. In the case of State v. Johnson, 76 Utah
84, 287 Pac. 909, the court considers at length the prob.lem, as follows:
"The question presented is as to whether error was
committed in submitting to the jury a material issue
upon which it is claimed there was insufficient evi.dence to support it, and, if so, whether the error
was prejudicial. If in a civil case where several acts
of negligence are charged, each constituting action . .
able negligence, and the evidence is insufficient as
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to one of such acts, but against objections neverthe.less is submitted to the jury and a general verdict
rendered in favor of the plantiff, hardly any one
would contend that no prejudice resulted on the
ground that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the verdict on the other alleged acts. In principle,
the mater in hand is not different. The jury here
rendered a general verdict of guilty 'as charged in
the information.' It thereby found the defendant
guilty of an unlawful act not supported or justi-fied by the evidence. Because the unlawful act re-lated to or concerned intoxicating liquors does not
call for an abridgement of the general rule that to
justify a submission of a material issue to a jury
there must be sufficient evidence to support it, nor
as to the prejudicial effect against whom it is sub.mitted and a general verdict rendered in favor of
his adversary having the burden of proof. The gen. .
eral verdict here is not severable. Letting all the is.sues as to all of the alleged unlawful acts to the jury
gave them to understand that they could render a
verdict of guilty on any one or all of them, which
was required to be expressed only by a general ver. .
diet. Some of the jurors may have been induced to
join in the verdict on one or more of the alleged
acts, some on other alleged acts, but on which or on
all it is impossible to tell. That none of the jury was
induced to join the verdict because of the submis. .
sion of the issue as to intoxication is also impossible
to tell." (Italics added.)
This fundamental principle was later affirmed in the
case of State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357, 68 Pac. (2d)
176, although the court there, by a divided opinion, con. .
eluded that the instructions were sufficient to advise the
jurors that they "must all agree on one or more specifica. .
tions of what constituted the unlawful driving and that
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the jurors cannot combine their conclusions on the differ. .
ent specifications of unlawfulness so as to converge to the
final conclusion of unlawful driving likely to cause death."
See also State v. Bleazard, 103 Utah 13, 133 Pac. (2d)
1000.
The court having failed to instruct the jury properly
in this respect, the verdict of the jury cannot be sustained.
3. THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT THE MERE FACT AN AUTOMOBILE
SKIDS OR SLIDES WHILE PROCEEDING ALONG A
WET OR SLIPPERY STREET IS NO EVIDENCE
THAT THE PARTY OPERATING THE SAME IS
DOING SO AT AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED.
It has long been established as a principle of law
that the skidding of a vehicle upon icy or slippery streets
is not itself evidence of reckless misconduct or that the
automobile was being operated at an excessive rate of
speed. In the case of Adamian v. Messerlian, 292 Mass.
275, 198 N. E. 166, the court stated the law applicable
to the case after relating the facts and circumstances of
the case, as follows:
"There was evidence tending to show these facts:
The accident happened about half past eleven
o'clock on the night of December 31, 1929. The
streets were particularly slippery and icy caused by
rain or mist freezing on the ground. The defendant,
having driven up the hill on Highland St_reet, in
Worcester, and having reached the top, began des. .
cending on the westerly side of the hill. The street
was twenty. .six feet eight inches wide, and the dis. .
tance from the top of the hill to the place of the
accident was nine hundred and eighty feet; there
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were three interscting streets on each side in that
distance. The automobile had no chains on the
wheels. The street at this point was thickly settled.
There was one other automobile going in the same
direction which the defendant passed or tried to
pass. Another automobile was coming on an inter-secting street, but there is no evidence that it came
upon Highland Street. There was evidence that the
speed of the defendant's automobile was at the
rate of forty . .five to fifty miles an hour..... There
was also evidence that the automobile did not begin
to skid until it had gone a considerable distance
down the hill, and that the defendant attempted
to check his speed by the use of his brakes. There
was no collision with any vehicle.
"There was no error in ordering the entry of ver. .
diets in favor of the defendant. The skidding of the
automobile in the circumstances disclosed was of
itself no evidence of negligence. Lonergan v. Ameri-can Railway Express Co., 250 Mass. 30, 35, 144 N.
E. 756."
In the case of Zeigler v. Ryan, 65 S. D. 110, 271 N.
W. 767, the court held:
"We consider first the question of whether there is
sufficient evidence in the record upon which to
submit the question of Kennedy's negligence to the
jury. From the facts it appears that the accident
was due to the skidding of the automobile as it was
regaining its correct position on the highway and
attempting to make the turn at the bottom of the
hill. The mere fact that an automobile skids on a
slippery pavement does not in itself constitute evi-dence of negligence on the driver's part or render
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applicable. Davis v.
Brown, 92 Cal. App. 20, 267 P. 754; Linden v.
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Miller, 172 Wis. 20, 177 N. W. 909, 12 A. L. R.
665; Barret v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Com..
pany, 165 La. 1075, 116 So. 563, 58 A. L. R. 261;
..-\nnotation in 58 A. L. R. 264."
See also Bradley v. Thomas M. Madden Co., 333 Ill.
App. 153, 76 N. E. (2d) 797; Amerine v. O'Neal, 136
Neb. 642, 287 N. W. 56; Wilson v. Congdon, 179 Wash.
400, 37 Pac. (2d) 892; Wallis v. Nauman, 61 Wyo. 231,
157 Pac. (2d) 285; State v. Biering, Ill Mont. 237, 107
Pac. (2d) 876. Risen v. Consolidated Coach Corp., (Ky)
118 S. W. (2d) 712; Gilbreath v. Blue & Gray Transpor. .
tation Co., 269 Ky. 787, 108 S. W. (2d) 1002.
In the Amerine Case, supra, the court after reciting
the following facts, determined the evidence was insuffi. .
dent to show gross negligence on the part of the defen. .
dant:
"Plaintiff had not driven his car to work because
some sleet had fallen the night before. Defendant
offered to give him a ride home. Part of the ice had
been worn off by traffic during the day, but the
pavement, as described by plaintiff, was still icy
and slippery in spots. Defendant drove without
chains, but, other than possibly to slide a little now
and then, his car had not skidded up to the time
of the accident. In fact, there is no complaint in the
briefs about defendant's driving, until the moment
preceding the collision.
"As defendant was approaching Forty . . Eighth
Street, about 20.-25 miles an hour, another car, tra.veling 40 miles an hour in the opposite direction,
swung onto defendant's side of the pavement, in an
effort to pass traffic. To avoid a head.-on collision,
defendant turned his car quickly to the right, off
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the pavement and onto the dirt shoulder. After
traveling about 100 feet, he attempted to swing it
back. The pavement was approximately 3 inches
higher than the shoulder of the highway. The left
rear wheel caught in some manner on the edge of
the pavement, causing the car to swing sideways
and to skid in front of an automobile approaching
from the opposite direction. A collision resulted."
In Wilson v. Congdon, supra, the court held:
"There is no evidence that appellant's automobile
was at any time operated on the wrong side of the
highway. That vehicle skidded from its own right. .
hand side of the highway to the extreme left. . hand
side of the highway, where it was struck by respon. .
dent's automobile.
"The failure of the driver of a motor vehicle to
keep to the right side of the highway is excused
where, without fault on his part, the machine skids
across the center line of the road, but, where skid . .
ding results from negligence, the driver is liable.
The law of the road requires that automobiles be
operated on the right of the center of the highway.
While skidding, in itself, is not ordinarily evidence
of negligence, where an automobile skids across the
center line of the road to the left side thereof and
collides with another automobile, the burden is up. .
on the driver upon the wrong side of the highway
to justify the violation of the law of the road.
Haines v. Pinney, 171 Wash. 568, 18 P. (2d) 496;
Dohm v. Cardozo, 165 Minn. 193, 206 N. W. 377."
In State v. Biering, supra, the defendant was charged
with the crime of reckless driving in that he operated his
automobile on to the wrong side of the road. In reversing
a conviction, the court held:
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"There is no substantial conflict in the evidence
on the material facts bearing upon this question.
The defendant at the time of the collision was some..
what to the left of the center of the road. He testi..
fied that when he saw the driver of the one car at..
tempt to pass the other he slammed on his brakes
in an effort to avoid a collision and his car swerved
to the left. The driver of the passing car stated that
when he got even with the car that he was passing,
the defendant's car was somewhat over to the left
of the center and was trying to cut off to the right.
The occurrence was a matter to be timed by 'split'
seconds. Four of the five eye witnesses testified that
the defendant was proceeding lawfully on his right
side of the road before the driver of the one car
attempted to pass the other. But for the purpose
of this case, we may assume that the defendant was
technically violating the statute prohibiting driving
on the wrong side of the road. One essential thing
to be proved under this complaint is that the act
of the defendant in driving on the wrong side
caused the accident."
The failure of the court to give defendant's requested
instruction resulted in the jury having the opportunity to
conclude that the skidding of an automobile was of such
serious consequences that it alone would warrant a find ..
ing of excessive speed and also reckless or wanton miscon..
duct on the part of the operator of the car. The jury was
not properly advised as to the legal effect of such skidding
or sliding, so that prejudice resulted to the defendant's
rights, requiring the verdict to be set aside.
CONCLUSION
By way of summary of the arguments contained in
this brief, appellant respectfully submits:
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1. The evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain the
conviction based upon wilful and wanton misconduct on
the part of the defendant.
2. There is no evidence justifying the court in sub-mitting to the jury the question whether defendant drove
and operated his automobile at an excessive rate of speed.
3. Nor is there any evidence justifying the court in
submitting to the jury the question of whether defendant
operated his automobile upon the wrong side of the high-way in an attempt to overtake and pass other vehicles pro-ceeding in the same direction.
At all events, if this court should determine that there
is some circumstantial evidence from which the jury might
conclude either that the defendant was operating at an
excessive rate of speed, or that he was attempting to over-take and pass other vehicles, then the trial court should
have submitted the matter to the jury on that theory, and
should have properly instructed them as to the weight and
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases.
4. The failure of the court to advise the jury that
they should unanimously agree upon one or both of the
alleged acts of misconduct was prejudicial to the rights of
the defendant.
5. The failure of the court to instruct the jury that
the mere fact defendant's automobile skidded was not evi-dence that it was being operated at an excessive rate of
speed and was not of itself wilful or wanton misconduct
was also prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Attorney /or Appellant.
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